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In the inaugural issue of the Duke Forum for Law & Social Change (the
“Forum”), the founders chose to pursue the question: “How Do We Move
Education Forward?” The panel presentations at the Spring Conference and the
articles in the inaugural publication address the question from two distinct
vantage points. First, the Forum asked panelists to tackle the question, “Does
Integration Still Matter?” At a time when some would contend that we are living
in a post-racial America—following the election of Barack Obama, the first black
President of the United States—the Forum members demonstrated their
understanding that a proactive challenge to the entrenched structural inequality
in our public education system remains vitally important to the future of public
education.1 The Forum’s Spring Conference stimulated probing discussion about

† Wendy B. Scott, Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University School of Law; B.A.
Harvard University and J.D. NYU School of Law. Professor Scott has written, lectured and consulted
extensively on issues surrounding school desegregation. She extends thanks to her colleagues at
North Carolina Central and those in attendance at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference 2009,
for their invaluable comments. The research support provided by Susan McCarty of the University of
Maryland School of Law library staff and Research Assistants, MyEsha Craddock and Jennifer
Shahabuddin is deeply appreciated. Special thanks to Professors Paulette Caldwell, Muriel Morrison,
Cassandra Havard, Rachal Moran for offering in-depth comments, and symposium co-panelist
Olatunde Johnson and Kristi Bowman for introducing a new generation of ideas into the
conversation on equal education opportunity for all children.
1. Scholars periodically query the relevance of desegregation remedies as we move further
forward from the days of de jure segregation and society becomes more diverse and integrated. See,
e.g., Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000) (proposing ways
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creative ways to address the continuing educational crisis. In the keynote
address, Rufus Williams, President of Chicago Public Schools, challenged the
audience to become involved in local school governance and contribute to the
public policy debate. New perspectives on integration are discussed in depth in
the articles by Professor Kristi Bowman and Professor Olati Johnson.
The second issue, “Innovations in Legal Education,” called for
reconsideration of teaching and testing methods in law school. The articles by
Professor Irene Ayers and Professor John Garvey propose several alternative
pedagogical and testing methods. The articles also discuss how innovative
pedagogy and assessment help reveal the benefits of diversity in the profession.
The founding editors of the Forum deserve thanks for advancing discussion on
the value of diversity in legal education and on the need to continue moving
towards actual equality in public education.
My Essay provides context for the articles that query the contemporary
relevance of integration. Part I addresses the challenge of understanding
desegregation and its relationship to integration. Part II explores the equality
rationales offered by courts and scholars to support or reject integration as the
most viable method for achieving desegregation. The Essay concludes that we
should move beyond substantive equality to anti-subordination strategies
targeted at the deeply entrenched structural inequalities that marginalize
children in poor or racially-isolated schools.
I. THE ORIGINAL DEBATE: DOES DESEGREGATION REQUIRE INTEGRATION?
Beyond the removal of statutory barriers, we generally understand
desegregation to mean “the actual attendance together in public schools of
significant proportions of black and white children as the result of judicial or
administrative orders issued by authorities outside the school district or by the
school authorities themselves as a result of litigation or the threat of litigation.”2
However, the political and legal debates over whether desegregation required
actual integration complicated the Court’s gradual arrival at an authoritative
meaning of desegregation. It appears, then, that what James Liebman observed
almost twenty years ago rings true today as evidenced by the split decision
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1:3 “[T]he legal,
intellectual, and moral bases for desegregation remain unstable even now.”4

to combat the dormancy of school desegregation litigation); john a. powell & Margaret L. Spencer,
Brown Is Not Brown And Educational Reform Is Not Reform If Integration Is Not The Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 346-51 (2003) (distinguishing reforms in delivery of education from achieving
racial integration); Danielle R. Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring The Resegregation Trend In Our Public
Schools, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2004) (questioning whether the resegregation trend is evidence
that integration has failed).
2. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1463, 1465 n.3 (1990) (undertaking an exhaustive discussion of five theories of desegregation).
3. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (deciding by plurality that plans to create more racially diverse schools
violated equal protection; with four dissents).
4. Liebman, supra note 2, at 1472.
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After Brown v. Board of Education,5 courts and scholars claimed that simply
ending de jure segregation by judicial and legislative edict satisfied it’s mandate
to provide equal educational opportunity. Others contended that desegregation
described the ideal of facilitating racial integration—through some voluntary
process or one required by law—in order to obtain a critical mass of minority
students in majority schools.6 Eventually, the latter viewpoint prevailed.
Desegregation developed into a judicially managed remedy to deconstitutionalize the social, economic, and political inequality reinforced by
Plessy v. Ferguson.7 Yet there is still no consensus by the Supreme Court over
whether actual system-wide integration, or good faith attempts that result in
some racially diverse schools alone satisfy the equality mandate of Brown I.
Desegregation law consists of federal and state court decisions as well as
federal, state, and local statutes and regulations intended to create and protect
the process of desegregation in a political system devoted to local control over
education. Desegregation jurisprudence accounts in large measure for the
expanded remedial power enjoyed by federal courts.8 Unfortunately, the courtsupervised implementation of these judicially mandated integration plans
conjures images of social unrest and racial conflict in communities across the
nation as they went through what both progressive9 and conservative10 thinkers
considered a failed social experiment. On the other hand, desegregation
fundamentally changed public education at all levels in America. The process
produced compulsory and voluntary racial integration at a level commonplace
today, but unheard of only two generations ago in America’s history.11
Moreover, the study of desegregation jurisprudence is interdisciplinary.
Thurgood Marshall and his legal team introduced social science evidence in
Brown I to prove the theory that segregation caused stigmatic injury to children
of color.12 History and politics also inform our understanding of the converging

5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that education systems separated based on race violated the
equal protection clause right to equal educational opportunity).
6. Liebman, supra note 2, at 1465 n.3.
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Although the initial remedial order in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294
(1955), only required state and local governments to act with “all deliberate speed” to end
segregation, eventually the Supreme Court recognized the expansive power of the federal judiciary to
mandate racial integration plans to satisfy the Brown mandate to end segregation.
9. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 123 (2004) (observing that “the pattern of black and Hispanic children’s
educational experience being undermined by uncaring teachers whose approach is geared to racial
stereotypes is far more widespread than any of us want to contemplate).
10. Members of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission on Civil Rights, chaired by Gerald Reynolds
and Abigail Thernstrom, concluded, “There is little evidence that racial and ethnic diversity in
elementary and secondary schools results in significant improvements in academic performance.”
The Benefits of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Elementary and Secondary Education, U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, July 28, 2006, at 3, available at www.usccr.gov/pubs/112806diversity.pdf.
11. SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 1 (John Boger & Gary Orfield, eds.,
2005) (describing the collection of essays as telling the story “of a South where schools have been
transformed beyond recognition. . . ”).
12. See Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 1952 WL 47265.
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interest that forged this area of law.13 Desegregation policies have also spurred
the growth of innovative education methods such as magnet schools,14
assessment tools to measure student development in racially integrated
settings,15 and single-sex education.16
Finally, desegregation law has expanded our understanding of equality and
due process.17 Over time, the Court reshaped the principle of equality largely in
the context of remedying the deprivation of rights to black Americans relegated
to second-class citizenship status. The Court moved from relying on the
deferential equality rationale that upheld segregation to formal declarations of
the equality of black and white Americans in Brown I. The Court’s initial
prohibition of segregation, however, eventually warranted an assertion of
judicial authority to impose an affirmative obligation on local governing bodies
to integrate schools. The next section explores the evolution from deferential
equality to the current debate over whether the formal or substantive equality
rationale (that supports affirmative plans to integrate) should guide the Court.
II. EQUALITY RATIONALES FOR DESEGREGATION
From Roberts v. City of Boston18 to Parents Involved,19 the goal of
desegregation has been to place children of color and white children on equal
footing in public education. During the one hundred and fifty plus years
between these two decisions, desegregation jurisprudence developed in response
to the entrenched system of racial hierarchy that prevented integrated education.
The equality rationales relied on by courts to accept or reject integration include
deferential equality, formal equality, substantive equality, and the nonsubordination theory of equality.
A. Deferential Equality
A desegregation case brought prior to the ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments failed because the court deferred to local authorities to decide
whether race-based school assignments contradicted the guarantee of equality. In
Roberts v. City of Boston the father of Sarah Roberts brought the first reported

13. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (rev. & expanded ed.
2004).
14. KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR
PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 282 (2005) (discussing the creation of choice as
a means of promoting integration with magnet and charter schools).
15. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
16. See generally Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in
Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455 (2005).
17. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), decided the same day as Brown I, held that education
systems operated under federal control in Washington, D.C. violated the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which incorporates the same principles of fairness as equal protection.
18. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
19. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
THE
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legal challenge to segregated schools in 1850.20 Roberts argued that separate
schools created a racial caste system in violation of the Massachusetts
Constitution.21 The plaintiff also argued that educational institutions built on a
caste system reinforced the social attitude that the entire black race “possess[es]
certain moral or intellectual qualities, which render it proper to place them all in
a class by themselves.”22 Finally, Roberts contended that even if facilities and
curricula at the white and black schools were identical, “a school exclusively
devoted to one class must differ . . . in its spirit and character.”23
In Roberts, the court deferred to the local school board despite the glaring
inequalities presented to the court. Chief Judge Shaw, foreshadowing arguments
made in Plessy, reasoned that social sentiment militated against recognizing the
same legal rights for white and black children.24 The court declared that the
exercise of state power to create separate schools was reasonable despite the
unequal instruction and conditions in the all-black schools.25 The Roberts decision
had far-reaching effects. Less than fifty years later in Plessy, the Supreme Court
relied on Roberts, and later state court opinions upholding separate schools for
white and black children, to justify segregation in public transportation.26
Deferential equality gave way to the purportedly neutral formal equality
rationale that individuals or groups that are alike, or similarly situated, should
be treated similarly based on their actual characteristics. For over sixty years,
from Plessy to Brown, the Supreme Court grappled with how to employ the
formal equality rationale.

20. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198. Boston established separate schools for Black children in
1820, at the behest of Black parents whose children could not attend the public schools “on account of
the prejudice then existing against them.” Id. at 200. Eventually the Massachusetts legislature
outlawed segregated schooling, but closed black schools and dismissed black teachers. Within ten
years, the schools were re-segregated. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 82–83 (2008).
21. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 201 (citing MASS. CONST. art. I, VI).
22. Id. at 203.
23. Id. The United States Supreme Court later adopted this “spirit and character” argument in
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), stating that long-established majority institutions possessed
intangible qualities “which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness.”
Id. at 634.
24. Compare Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 209–10 (“It is urged, that this maintenance of separate
schools tends to deepen and perpetuate the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted
prejudice in public opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and probably cannot be
changed by law. Whether this distinction and prejudice, existing in the opinion and feelings of the
community, would not be as effectually fostered by compelling colored and white children to
associate together in the same schools, may well be doubted; at all events, it is a fair and proper
question for the committee to consider and decide upon, having in view the best interests of both
classes of children placed under their superintendence, and we cannot say, that their decision upon it
is not founded on just grounds of reason and experience, and in the results of a discriminating and
honest judgment.”) with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (“If one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”).
25. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 209–10.
26. “Similar laws have been enacted by congress under its general power of legislation over the
District of Columbia (sections 281–283, 310, 319, Rev. St. D. C.), as well as by the legislatures of many
of the states, and have been generally, if not uniformly, sustained by the courts.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at
545.
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B. Formal Equality
The fledgling ideal of formal equality emerged when the Court reasoned
that segregation laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment as long as the
same treatment applied to both black and white citizens.27 The Plessy decision
solidified constitutional protection for segregation under this original formal
equality rationale. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, also based on the formal
equality rationale, reached the opposite conclusion.28 Justice Harlan shared the
clearly expressed racial prejudice of the Court.29 He was, however, able to
separate his personal and legal views.30
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund developed a strategy to reverse Plessy and
its effects. The goal was to obtain a declaration from the Court endorsing racially
integrated schools because segregation in public education offended equality.31
Starting in 1938, the Supreme Court prohibited segregation in several public
universities.32 The Court reasoned that since the states could not provide “the
same” education to black students as provided for white students, their only
alternative was to admit black students. The campaign to overrule the separate–
but-equal doctrine culminated in Brown v. Board of Education.33

27. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (“The object of the [Fourteenth A]mendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”); see
also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding Alabama law punishing fornication and
adultery between a white person and black person more severely than between persons of the same
color); but see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting the state’s “equal application”
argument that anti-miscegnation laws equally prohibited interracial marriage by blacks and whites).
28. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., id. at 552 (majority opinion) (“If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”); id. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty.”). For a critique of Harlan’s use of the formal equality rationale, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
30. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved.”).
31. Brief for Appellants at 15–17, Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 1952 WL 47265 (arguing for system wide
integration that social science evidence suggests leads to positive race relations).
32. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (striking down practices in the
University of Oklahoma Graduate School that admitted a black student but separated him from his
classmates in the library, cafeteria and classrooms); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring
the State of Texas to admit African Americans to the law school); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631
(1948) (ordering the admission of a black applicant into the Oklahoma state law school); Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (ordering the admission of a black applicant into the
Missouri state law school).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring separate education systems inherently unequal). For a
comprehensive history of the campaign launched by the NAACP and other organizations to overrule
Plessy, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (rev. & expanded ed. 2004)(1975) .
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In Brown the Court finally directly confronted the issue of whether the use
of state police power to require separate schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown rested on the assumption that the long denial of equal
protection stigmatized black students at all levels of education.34 Even if the
states could in fact provide virtually identical schools for black and white
students, segregation itself, especially when practiced by the state, was
repugnant to the Constitution. In sum, the Court found that segregation
produced inherent inequality. Moreover, Leibman explains that desegregation
broke up the “ingrained willingness of our political system to count ‘the racist
opinion’—that citizens of one race are less deserving of political respect”—as a
valid basis for deciding how to allocate scarce resources.35
A unanimous Court overruled the formal equality analysis of Plessy. But
overruling Plessy did not resolve the contradiction inherent in the formal equality
rationale. As Reva Siegel rightly observed, ”When Brown v. Board of Education
prohibited racial segregation in public education, it inaugurated a great debate
about equal citizenship and federalism that spanned the second half of the
twentieth century.”36
Shortly after Brown, scholars recognized that the Court had not yet
completed its task. Because the Court-constructed desegregation law was built
on the idea of formal equality, the debate over what equality required centered
largely on whether Brown stood for the proposition that racial classification is per
se unconstitutional, or that racial classification is permissible when used to
disrupt rather than further the racial subordination of a racial minority group.37

34. The brief for the Brown plaintiffs used rudimentary social science to argue that racial
segregation itself had a detrimental effect on children of color. Brief for Appellants, supra note 12, at
8–9. The detrimental effects included denial of “the opportunity available to all other racial groups to
learn to live, work, and cooperate with the [majority white] population; to develop citizenship skills;
and to adjust themselves personally and socially in a setting comprising a cross-section of the
dominant population.” Id. at 9.
35. Liebman, supra note 2, at 1474. Similarly, Reva Siegel observes:
At the core of arguments about classification and group harm that stretch across the
decades are questions of legitimacy: in what ways and to what extent can the Constitution
be construed to mandate intervention in the affairs of a relatively powerful group, on
behalf of a less powerful group? Conflicts over this question do much to shape the relation
of claims about racial classification and racial subordination in the modern equal protection
tradition.
Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474 (2004). Cf. Wendy Brown Scott, The Sin of Racism: Comments on
the Remarks of Chancellor Julius Chambers, 27 CAP. L. REV. 35 (1998) (characterizing the treatment of
black Americans and the denial of racial equality as mean-spirited).
36. Siegel, supra note 35, at 1470.
37. “The problem which the courts face in giving meaning to ‘equal protection’ is to determine
which particular types of classifications are so unequal and discriminatory as to be within the
constitutional purview of this clause. . . [On the other hand s]ome unequal and discriminatory laws
will be held valid under the equal protection clause.” ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE
FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION
CASES 114–15 (1957). For alternative viewpoints on the contradictions produced by formal equality
premised on First Amendment principles, see Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (critiquing segregation for violating the freedom of
association rights of black citizens and integration for violating the same rights of white citizens). For
a critique of the freedom of choice rationale, see Wendy R. Brown, The Convergence of Neutrality and
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After the Court’s remedial command in Brown v. Board of Education II to
desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”38 state officials and local school boards
used formal equality like a two-edged sword to resist the idea that equal
protection required compulsory integration.39 On the one hand, the concept of
formal equality could support the premise that only race-neutral or color-blind
policies satisfy the mandates of equal protection, despite the failure of those
policies to produce integrated schools.40 Thus, the demise of the doctrine of
separate-but-equal, school boards resistant to integration argued, ended the
government’s authority to make race-based distinctions under any
circumstances. On the other hand, the intentional failure of post-Brown raceneutral “choice” plans to integrate schools41 led the Court to revisit the question
of what equality required. School boards throughout the South, under political
pressure and threat of violence from white citizens, devised race-neutral
desegregation policies intended to delay integration. Lower courts charged with
enforcing Brown I condoned the use of race-neutral plans to protect the status
quo for white students, despite their obvious and intentional failure to achieve
meaningful equality.42 Such widespread resistance signaled the need for the
Court to go beyond formal equality.

Choice: The Limits of the State’s Affirmative Duty to Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60 TENN. L.
REV. 63 (1992) (discussing why it is inappropriate to justify the continuation of racially segregated
and unequal colleges and universities on the basis of the right of free association).
38. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
39. For an example of one of the original cases consolidated with Brown, see Briggs v. Elliott, 132
F.Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (finding that Brown did not require integration and did not “forbid
such segregation that occurs as a result of voluntary action”). See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 199–202
(1994) (discussing how white school boards crafted complex unworkable plans and state
constitutional amendments to enshrine segregation, while black parents remained reluctant to send
their children to predominantly white schools).
40. For a perspective that suggests a substantial dichotomy between colorblindness and racial
neutrality, see Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, But Are We Losing the
War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2005). Nelson embraced the anticlassification norm, but distinguished
colorblindness and racial neutrality, writing, “Contrary to some theories, race-neutral measures do
not necessitate a color-blind approach to achieving the goal of providing meaningful educational
opportunities to minority students.” Id. at 6. She claims, “It is not necessary . . . for [race-neutral]
programs to neglect or ignore race and the influence of race on certain students in order to be
considered race-neutral. It is only necessary that they do not allow applicants to be classified and/or
selected based on their race or ethnicity.” Id. at 8.
41. For a discussion of the origins of “freedom of choice” plans and their effect on desegregation,
see Brown, supra note 37, at 97–100.
42. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) rev’g Green v. County Sch. Bd., 382
F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967) (striking down a typical race-neutral desegregation plan, that had been
upheld by the district court and court of appeals). In the Kent County, Virginia, school system,
children were given the option of choosing between the county’s two elementary schools, one all
white the other all African-American. Id. at 431–32. The Court noted that in three years of operation
under the plan, “not a single white child has chosen to attend [the black school] and . . . 85% of the
Negro children still attend the all-Negro . . . school.” Id. at 441. See also Bowman v. County Sch. Bd.,
382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that a racial integration plan was not required and that
freedom of choice plan that gave black children an unrestricted right to attend any school in the
system did not violate their constitutional rights); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372
F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 380 F.2d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 1967) (expressly abolishing
certain types of freedom of choice plans).
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B. Substantive Equality
The substantive equality rationale rejects the anti-classification norm in
favor of an understanding of equality that goes beyond requiring the repeal of
segregation laws. In Parents Involved, Justice Breyer wrote that the Equal
Protection Clause “outlaws invidious discrimination, but does not similarly
forbid all use of race-conscious criteria.”43 Therefore, substantive equality
supported race-conscious affirmative action, aggressive remedial intervention by
the court, and improvements in student achievement. The Court, however, did
not arrive at a substantive understanding of equality with haste.
Owen Fiss referred to crafting remedies to desegregate schools as the
“central riddle” of school desegregation law.44 Therefore, the failure of the Court
in Brown II to mandate swift and effective integration plans delayed the
realization of desegregated, and presumably equal schools. Fourteen years after
Brown I, the Supreme Court finally demanded affirmative and race-conscious
enforcement. Green v. County School Board45 signaled a move by the court away
from color-blind formal equality to a more substantive meaning of what Brown I
required to satisfy the equality mandate. While so-called “choice” plans were not
per se constitutional,46 the Court promised to strike down any plan that
perpetuated segregation and to uphold plans intended to convert segregated
school systems into unitary school systems.47 After accusing the school board of
the “deliberate perpetuation” of racially segregated schools,48 the Justices called
eleven years of delay “intolerable” and ordered “meaningful and immediate
progress.”49 The Court mandated that recalcitrant school boards “fashion steps
which promise realistically to convert promptly to system[s] without a ‘white’
school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”50
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court affirmed its
role in advancing remedies to achieve substantive equality.51 Justice Burger
amplified the guidelines for schools to meet their constitutional obligations.

43. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2834 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
44. Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case—Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 697 (1971).
45. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
46. In fact, Justice Breyer characterized the Seattle and Louisville school assignment plans as the
kinds of choice plans permitted under Green. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2825 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(concluding that “choice and not race was the “predominant factor in the plans).
47. Id. at 441–42. School systems are considered “unitary” when a court finds that the boards
have acted in “good faith” to eliminate “the vestiges of past discrimination . . . to the extent
practicable.” Therefore, lower courts dismissed desegregation decrees even when racial imbalance or
single-race schools persisted in a school district. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991)
(holding that lower courts should apply a good faith test in determining whether a school board has
achieved unitary status); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (permitting incremental or partial
withdrawal of court supervision and control); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740–41, 746 (defining
the constitutional right of black children as the right to attend school in a unitary district without
regard to any particular racial balance in each school, grade, or classroom).
48. Id. at 438.
49. Id. at 439.
50. Id. at 442.
51. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Specifically, the Court called for school boards to “eliminate invidious racial
distinctions” that existed in “transportation, supporting personnel, and
extracurricular activities . . . [as well as] the maintenance of buildings and the
distribution of equipment.”52
C. Retreat from Substantive Equality
Between 1971 and 1995, in a series of contentious decisions, the unanimity
of the Court in favor of substantive equality waned. Judicial assault on and
sociopolitical backlash against desegregation efforts came from several
directions. The post-Brown debate spiraled into conflict over affirmative action
and whether courts should continue supervising desegregation efforts in the face
of demographic changes that made achieving racial integration impossible in
majority minority urban school districts like Detroit. In Milliken v. Bradley, the
lower court had approved an inter-district remedy that included suburban
school systems surrounding Detroit that had not been found to have practiced de
jure segregation. The Supreme Court rejected the desegregation plan on the
ground that the lower courts had exceeded their equitable powers.53 The Court
also held, in opposition to its position in Swann, that the constitutional mandates
of Brown I and II did not call for achieving racially balanced schools.54 According
to Milliken, black children were constitutionally entitled to attend school in a
unitary school system, not a racially balanced school within the system.55 Milliken
also rejected evidence that racial segregation in housing contributed to racial
segregation in schools,56 preventing school officials from accounting for changing
residential demographics in crafting desegregation plans.

52. Id. at 18.
53. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 (1974) (“The formulation of an interdistrict remedy was
. . . simply not responsive to the factual record before the District Court and was an abuse of that
court's equitable powers.”).
54. Id. at 745–46.
55. Id. at 740–41 (“[D]esegregation does not require any particular racial balance in each school,
grade, or classroom”).
56. Id. at 721, 751 (rejecting district court finding that state action, combined with private action,
established and maintained the pattern of residential segregation in Detroit and surrounding suburbs
that made intra-district desegregation impossible); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2758 (2007) (characterizing the effect of racially identifiable housing
patterns on perpetuating racially isolated schools as societal discrimination that is beyond the scope
of the school board’s authority to address); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 94–96 (1995) (rejecting
reliance on “white flight” as a justification for expansion of a remedial plan to attract suburban
students to urban schools); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435–36 (1976)
(reasoning that school districts are not required to address the “normal pattern of human migration”
that accepts the racial mix of housing and therefore schools); Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and
School Resegregation [hereinafter Orfield, Segregated Housing], in GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. ORTON,
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 291 (1996)
(chronicling the inconsistent position of the Supreme Court on the role of state action in housing
patterns that perpetuate school segregation); see generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (documenting the
devastating impact of residential segregation on black socioeconomic advancement); Michelle
Adams, Separate and [Un]Equal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the Federally Subsidized
Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413 (1996) (attributing entrenched housing patterns to widespread
government housing discrimination). For the most recent comprehensive study of the impact of
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Milliken also signaled a retreat from advancing substantive equality by
severely limiting for the first time the scope of district courts’ equitable power to
remedy inequality.57 Eventually, school boards across the country began to argue
that their court-ordered integration plans had succeeded in creating unitary
school systems.58 Ironically, many schools within those systems remained
racially identifiable. Nonetheless, lower courts released hundreds of school
systems from court supervision.59 By releasing school boards from judicial
supervision, the Court set in motion a retreat to the race-neutral anticlassification approach under the formal equality rationale. As predicted by
Justice Thurgood Marshall in his last school desegregation opinion, the Court’s
retreat to formal equality would help accelerate the re-segregation of schools.60
The Court continued its retreat from substantive equality in Missouri v.
Jenkins.61 Jenkins involved the Kansas City, Missouri school district, which
operated segregated schools before Brown. In 1984, a federal district court found
that the city and state continued to maintain segregated schools. The judge
ordered the city and state to create a number of well-funded magnet schools to
attract white children to the city’s schools.62
The presentation of the facts in Jenkins exemplifies the tension on the Court
between proponents of formal equality and proponents of substantive equality.
In summarizing the facts, Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the 5-4 majority
opinion, presented the case in race-neutral, colorblind terms typical in a formal
equality analysis. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist provided no facts
regarding the constitutional violation. Instead, he employed an a-historical costbenefit analysis that balanced the intangible cost of the loss of equal protection
by millions of children over the years against monetary expenditures by the
school board between 1985 and 1994.63 He characterized the cost of the remedial

demographic shifts and changes on school desegregation, see Becoming Less Separate? School
Desegregation, Justice Department Enforcement And The Pursuit Of Unitary Status, UNITED STATES CIVIL
RIGHTS
COMMISSION,
Sept.
27,
2007,
available
at
http://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/092707_BecomingLessSeparateReport.pdf [hereinafter Becoming Less Separate].
57. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 777 (White, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “incapacitating the
remedial authority of the federal judiciary”).
58. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Anderson v. Sch. Bd., 517 F.3d 292 (5th Cir.
2008); Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001); Jenkins v. Missouri, 11
F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993).
59. The Civil Rights Commission study reported that from 2000 to 2007, the Department of
Justice’s docket of elementary and secondary school desegregation cases dropped from
approximately 450 cases to 266. Becoming Less Separate, supra note 56, at 28. This does not include the
school boards that remain under Department of Education supervision, or litigation initiated by
private plaintiffs.
60. Justice Thurgood Marshall issued early warnings of the potential re-segregation that would
occur if school boards were no longer under legal compulsion to maintain desegregated school
systems. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 259–60 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming
that the re-emergence of racially separated schools would cause harm to black children).
61. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). Plaintiffs filed suit against the school board and school officials in 1977. In
1984, after a lengthy trial, the District Court determined that the State and Kansas City School District
were liable for operating a segregated school system.
62. Id. at 76–77.
63. Id. at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dating laws of racial subordination through slavery in
Missouri back to 1724).

Scott_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete)

6/23/2009 1:31:22 PM

12 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

Vol. 1:1 2009

plan as excessive64 without regard to the immeasurable lack of resources made
available for the education of African American and other minority children as
far back as Roberts in the nineteenth century. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
criticized the majority’s myopic view, writing: “The Court stresses that the
present remedial programs have been in place for seven years. But compared to
more than two centuries of firmly entrenched official discrimination, the
experience with the desegregation remedies ordered by the District Court has
been evanescent.”65
The Jenkins majority’s enough-is-enough presentation of the facts rest on a
perspective reminiscent of the Court’s attitude towards post-slavery remediation
in the Civil Rights Cases:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation
has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen,
and ceases to be a special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or
a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are
protected.66

But in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg reminded the majority that, “[g]iven the
deep, inglorious history of segregation in Missouri, to curtail desegregation at
this time and in this manner is an action at once too swift and too soon.”67
Overall, the presentation of facts by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter provided
a more realistic context by opening with a discussion of the early twentiethcentury state laws against educating children of color and describing the
recalcitrant attitude of the states towards the enforcement of Brown.68
Desegregation premised on formal equality had come to rely heavily on
evidence of a causal connection between continued practices, or vestiges, of
discrimination and unconstitutional pre-Brown segregation laws. In the face of
the history presented by the dissent, the Jenkins majority questioned the causal
connection between intentional state discrimination and the persistence of

64. The district court’s desegregation plan has been described as the most ambitious and
expensive remedial program in the history of school desegregation. Id. at 78-79 (citing Jenkins v.
Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 397 (1994) (Beam, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
65. Id. at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. The Civil Rights Cases, 103 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). See also Mark V. Tushnet, The “We’ve Done
Enough” Theory of School Desegregation, 39 HOW. L.J. 767 (1996) (comparing the retreat by white
citizens from support for African American interests during the Civil Rights Cases era and Jenkins).
67. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Justice Souter wrote:
After Brown, neither the state nor the [Kansas City, Missouri School District] moved to
dismantle this system of separate education “root and branch” despite their affirmative
obligation to do that under the Constitution. “Instead, the [City] chose to operate some
completely segregated schools and some integrated ones” . . . . Consequently, on the
[twentieth] anniversary of Brown in 1974, 39 of the 77 schools . . . had student bodies that
were more than 90 percent black . . . . Ten years later . . . 24 schools remained racially
isolated with more than 90 percent black enrollment. Because the State and [City]
intentionally created this segregated system of education, and subsequently failed to
correct it, the District Court concluded that the State and the district had “defaulted in their
obligation to uphold the Constitution.”
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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racially isolated schools.69 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote at
length to challenge the dissenting justices’ claim that there remained a causal
connection between past segregation and current conditions.70 Justice Thomas
insisted that “[w]hen a district court holds the State liable for discrimination
almost 30 years after the last official state action, it must do more than show that
there are schools with high black population or low test scores.”71 He contended:
District courts must not confuse the consequences of de jure segregation with the
results of larger social forces of private decisions. . . . As state-enforced
segregation recedes further into the past, it is more likely that “these kinds of
continuous and massive demographic shifts,” will be the real source of racial
imbalance or of poor educational performance in a school district.72

He concluded: “Federal courts should not lightly assume that States have
caused ‘racial isolation’ in 1984 by maintaining a segregated school system in
1954.”73 Justice Souter countered with a broader interpretation of the causation
requirement, arguing: “There is in fact no break in the chain of causation linking the
effects of desegregation with those of segregation.”74
Proponents of substantive equality, like Justice Breyer, Souter, and
Ginsburg, also claimed that one measure of whether equality had been realized
was student achievement.75 Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed in Jenkins, quoting
extensively from a dissenting judge on the Court of Appeals who claimed that
the district court had wrongly embedded a “student achievement goal” as a
measure of whether Kansas City had sufficiently remedied past discrimination.76
The majority, therefore, found that Dowell and Freeman did not impose this

69. Id. at 96 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 117–18.
72. Id. at 117–18 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 138.
74. Id. at 164 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
75. In earlier cases, courts included educational achievement components recognizing that part
of being separate was being denied access to educational resources. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 21 (1969) (per curiam) (affirming discretion of court of appeals to
require implementation of federal educational requirements); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1967) (incorporating remedial programs in the court order); Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 246, 264 (D. Mass. 1975), aff’d, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976) (ordering
more state financial assistance for improving educational performance); United States v. Texas, 342 F.
Supp. 24, 28 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff’d, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972) (requiring staff training, counseling
and special education); United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 423 F.2d 1264, 1268 (5th Cir. 1969)
(ordering the transfer of equipment, supplies, and libraries). The most insightful challenges to
desegregation as a panacea for ensuring quality education for children of color have come from
Derrick Bell. Bell relies on research and his personal experience in litigating school desegregation
cases to question the utility of desegregation in improving the educational experience of black
children. He claims that desegregation “leaves dominant group values intact, does no damage to the
notion of white superiority and helps to gain the support of those whites who view it as a means of
helping nonwhite people to become fully human.” BELL, supra note 9, at 122. See also Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 619 (1992) (referring to Brown as bringing about
transformation without change).
76. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 83 (1995) (majority opinion).
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measure as a condition for release from court supervision.77 The majority ordered
the district court, on remand, to “sharply limit, if not dispose with” reliance on
achieving desegregation through quality education programs.78 He concluded
with an endorsement of local control, claiming that “[i]nsistence upon academic
goals unrelated to the effects of legal segregation unwarrantably postpones the
day when the [school district] will be able to operate on its own.”79
D. Substantive Equality and Diversity
After Jenkins, the discourse surrounding race in early and secondary
education shifted from achieving formal equality through desegregation to the
substantive equality concept of diversity. School boards believed that doing so
would allow for more focus on the actual educational benefits of integration and
less on the showing of a causal connection between past segregation and present
effects such as racially isolated schools. In Comfort v. Lynn School Committee,80
parents who opposed the school committee’s race-conscious transfer restrictions
brought suit. They relied on the formal equality anti-classification rationale,
arguing that “mechanically taking race into account” violated the Equal
Protection Clause.81 The First Circuit rejected the argument. Instead, the majority
relied on Grutter v. Bollinger82 to base the finding that elementary and secondary
schools reaped the benefits that flow from having a racially diverse student body
and avoiding the negative consequences that accompany racial isolation.83 Of
significance, the Court found that the evidence presented on the impact of
diverse classrooms suggested that “the benefits of a racially diverse school are
more compelling at younger ages.”84
Like the plans in Lynn, the diversity plans scrutinized by the Court in
Parents Involved represented efforts by Seattle and Louisville school boards to
operate creatively by also relying on the Grutter diversity rationale. Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion provides a detailed historical context for both
plans.85 The boards drafted school assignment plans that used race consistent

77. Id. at 88–89 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991)).
78. Id. at 101.
79. Id. at 102.
80. 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005).
81. Id. at 12.
82. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (concluding that the state law school had a compelling state interest in
securing the educational benefits of diversity).
83. 418 F.3d at 14.
84. Id. at 15–16.
85. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Seattle had never operated under a court order to desegregate, but did settle a lawsuit
that required mandatory busing as a term of the agreement. Later, segregated housing patterns made
it necessary for the school board to use race as a factor in school assignments to achieve diversity and
avoid racial isolation within the school system. Id. at 2747. In a continuing effort to desegregate
schools, Seattle implemented a student assignment plan that used race as a “tie-breaker” between
1998 and 2002 in the school assignment lottery. Id. at 2805–07. (Breyer, J, dissenting). After Brown, the
Jefferson County public schools in Louisville, Kentucky continued to operate segregated schools until
placed under a court-ordered desegregation plan from 1975–2000. Id. at 2806–07. In 2000, the district
court declared that the school board had, “to the extent practicable,” achieved unitary status. Id. at
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with their understanding of what Grutter allowed.86 Parents Involved addressed
whether public school systems that had not operated legally segregated schools,
like Seattle, or had been found to be unitary, like Louisville, may use race as a
factor in making school assignments.87 Respondents argued that both promoting
diversity to maintain integration and avoiding the perpetuation of racially
isolated schools constituted compelling state interests.88
The Court splintered on both questions. Justice Roberts employed the
formal equality rationale and called for an end to race-conscious remedies in
school assignment, stating: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”89 Justice Breyer and his fellow
dissenters, however, coupled with Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion,90
formed a majority view that increasing diversity in K-12 education and avoiding
racially isolated schools are compelling state interests that advance substantive
equality.91
Justice Breyer emphasized the historical and remedial elements of diversity,
explaining that the diversity interest has three essential elements:
an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation . . .
an interest in continuing to combat remnants of segregation caused in whole or
in part by these school-related policies [and] an interest in maintaining hard-won
gains . . . and preventing what gradually may become the de facto re-segregation
of America’s schools.92

Justice Breyer contended that these were exactly the kind of “choice” plans that
could withstand scrutiny under Green.93 A majority of the Court, therefore,
secured the groundwork for the continued reliance on the substantive equality
rationale.
III. ANTI-SUBORDINATION
We started our exploration of equality rationales underlying desegregation
with the idea that desegregation law developed in response to entrenched
systems of racial hierarchy that subordinated children of color in school. Yet, the
2809. A year after being released from the decree, however, the school board chose to create a
“managed choice plan” with magnet schools to maintain integrated schools. Id.
86. Id. at 2753–54 (2007).
87. Id. at 2746.
88. Id. at 2755–57.
89. Id. at 2768.
90. Id. . at 2788–97 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 2800–37(Breyer, J., dissenting). “[T]he evidence supporting an educational interest in
racially integrated schools is well established and strong enough to permit a democratically elected
school board reasonably to determine that this interest is a compelling one. Id. at 2821. See also Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (endorsing the law school’s admissions plan as advancing the
compelling state interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body).
But see Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776–79 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the educational
benefit from “coerced racial mixing” is “far from apparent”).
92. Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2825 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Book Note, The Desegregation Dilemma, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1144, 1146 (1996) (reviewing literature that endorses “equity choice” plans that combine
elements of school choice policy with voluntary desegregation measures).
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Court has never fully embraced the idea that equality requires structural changes
in public education to end the adverse effects of racial subordination on people
of color.94 Critical race theorists have argued that race itself has been socially
constructed to justify racial discrimination.95 Therefore, Richard Delgado, for
instance, has urged scholars to give serious attention to the impact of socially
constructed white privilege left in place even after the demise of state-sponsored
racism. He describes the privilege as “a system of informal favors, exchanges,
informal networks, old-boy references, and college entrance criteria by which
whites see to their own.”96 Without confronting the reality of white privilege,
Delgado contends, “the system of white-over-black power relations will hardly
budge.”97
Moreover, in less than fifty years, it is likely that the majority of Americans
will be people of color.98 Again, Delgado advocates moving beyond the twogroup, black/white model to also counter the types of discrimination
experienced by Latinos, Asians and Native Americans.99 For instance, these
changing demographics will create the urgent need to reshape our educational
system to accomplish what I call “transformative desegregation.” Transformative
desegregation is “intellectual desegregation,”100 intended to go beyond the
models of desegregation that emphasize simply putting children of different

94. Reva Siegel makes a similar point: “The modern equal protection tradition is commonly
understood to be founded on an embrace of individualism associated with an anticlassification
principle and a repudiation of concerns about group inequality associated with an antisubordination
principle.” Siegel, supra note 35, at 1547. She suggests that “understanding that anticlassification and
antisubordination are competing principles that vindicate different complexes of values and justify
different doctrinal regimes is an outgrowth of decades of struggle over Brown, and is not itself a
ground of the decision or of the earliest debates it prompted.” Id. at 1474–75.
95. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social
Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Kimberlé Crenshaw,
The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door”, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2002).
96. Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1269, 1271 (2006) [hereinafter Current Landscape].
97. Id. See also powell & Spencer, supra note 1 at 345 (contending that colorblind mentality and
constitutional proceduralism support and normalize white privilege). For discussions of white
privilege in the context of the 2008 presidential campaign, see Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Editorial, No Loss for
Feminism, BALT. SUN, June 8, 2008, at 13A (describing the face-off between Hillary Clinton and Barack
Obama as “the continuing power of sexism over racism as a barrier to equality”).
98. In fact, according to some experts, two significant causes of the declining percentage of white
students in the South are the influx of blacks and international migration. Gary Orfield, Southern
Dilemma: Losing Brown, Fearing Plessy, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 1
(John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
99. Current Landscape, supra note 96, at 1272. The potential for tensions among people of color has
been brought out in recent studies of the relative success of immigrant black Americans compared to
black people who have been in the United States for generations. Scott Jaschik, Black (Immigrant)
Admissions Edge, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2009/03/17/immigrant.
100. Wendy Brown Scott, Transformative Desegregation: Liberating Hearts and Minds, 2 IOWA J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 315 (1999) [hereinafter Transformative Desegregation]; Wendy Brown Scott, The
Miseducation of White America, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 73 (2002) (characterizing public school curricula
as a vestige of past discrimination subject to remedial attention in desegregation and diversity
planning).
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races in close physical proximity, or avoiding harm to whites.101 Transformative
desegregation
first
requires
that
students
unlearn
the
racial
superiority/inferiority model, a process described by author and activist bell
hooks as “decolonization.”102 Second, transformative desegregation requires
curricula changes in public education to undo the harm caused by the distorted
images of people of color shaped in the crucible of oppression.103 Finally, both
substantive and anti-subordination models for diversity support transformative
desegregation.
CONCLUSION
In the articles that follow, Professors Bowman and Johnson answer the
question, “Does integration still matter?” with a qualified “yes.” Both authors
embrace the substantive and anti-subordination equality rationales. In her article
Integration, Reconstructed, Johnson contends that while discussing racial
integration in schools seems outmoded, given current demographics and greater
interest in educational equity, the success of the Louisville plan104 challenges the
notion that integration is futile. She examines the mechanisms that made the plan
largely a success. She concludes with an anti-subordination equality claim that
since the Court left some constitutional breathing room for policies that promote
integration, integration’s contemporary salience depends on tying it to the larger
project to create structural racial equality. In A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial
and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, Professor Bowman contends that school
desegregation is rarely an effective vehicle in the pursuit of substantive equality.
Instead, she focuses on race-conscious remedies in school-finance litigation in
order to combat the compounding, subordinating effects of race and poverty as a
route to equal education.
But while the articles that follow reach varying answers to the question
posed, we all agree that equality will always matter in a democratic society
committed to providing a meaningful education to our children. How and when
we achieve an equitable system of education remains a challenge in the twentyfirst century.105 Justice O’Connor and Justice Ginsburg both comment on the
importance of reaching the goals articulated by Justice Breyer. Writing for the
majority in Grutter, O’Connor concluded the opinion stating: “We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest [in diversity] approved today.”106 While Justice Ginsburg
concurred with the aspiration for diversity, she hesitated to suggest a timeframe,
writing:
101. Transformative Desegregation, supra note 100, at 370–73 (discussing the evolution of various
judicial concepts of desegregation).
102. Id. at 321.
103. Id.
104. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
105. Justice Breyer counters the plurality’s certainty that color-blind school assignment plans are
justified under the formal equality rationale, stating: “By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how
best to stop harmful discrimination. . . how best to create a society that includes all Americans; how
best to overcome our serious problems of increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner city schooling
and poverty co-related with race.” Id. at 2833 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
106. Grutter v. Bollinger, 529 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) .
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However strong the public’s desire for improved education systems may be . . . it
remains the current reality that many minority students encounter markedly
inadequate and unequal educational opportunities. . . . From today’s vantage
point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span,
progress towards non-discrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make
it safe to sunset affirmative action.”107

As if heeding the warning issued by Justice Marshall in Dowell, five justices
in Parents Involved agreed that avoiding re-segregation or racial isolation is a
compelling state interest, which permits school systems to continue crafting
narrowly tailored plan to promote diversity. By doing so, the Court has left room
to continue the very discussion chronicled in this historic inaugural issue.

107.

Id. at 246 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

